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WILL THE INTERACTION OF THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL
LEAVE ACT AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT LEAVE EMPLOYEES WITH AN "UNDUE HARDSHIP?"
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you had severely broken both ofyour legs in a car accident
and took twelve weeks of combined paid and unpaid leave, as permitted
under The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA '),' to recover
from your injuries. After a trying recovery, you return to the job you have
held for the past ten years as a paralegal. However, you still need
continuous physical therapy and often miss entire work days because the
pain is so severe. You request, and believe you are entitled to, modifica-
tions in your work schedule and additional leave as a "reasonable
accommodation "2 under the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990
("ADA ').' However, your employer is a relatively small firm with only
sixty employees. Your employer fires you, claiming that the firm has
already incurred substantial losses by granting you twelve weeks of FMLA
leave, and that your requested schedule changes and additional leave are
an "undue hardship "4 on the business. What do you do?'
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (Supp. V 1993).
2. The Americans with Disabilities Act defines "reasonable accommodation" to include
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities; and (3) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices,
appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the
provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for
individuals with disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (Supp. V 1993). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
defines "reasonable accommodation" as "[miodifications or adjustments to a job application process
... or... the work environment ... that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the
essential functions of that position." 29 C.F.t. § 1630.2(o) (1995). The EEOC indicates that the purpose
behind the "reasonable accommodation" requirement is to provide "[m]odifications or adjustments that
enable an employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are
enjoyed by other similarly situated employees without disabilities." Id. § 1630.2(o)(iii). See also H.R.
REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 39-40 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 462-
63; BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT-EEOC: A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL
ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACr S-15 (1992)
[hereinafter EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL].
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993).
4. The ADA defines an undue hardship as:
an action requiring significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light of the
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When an employee suffers a prolonged illness, she may be eligible for
leave under both the Family and Medical Leave Act and the Americans
with Disabilities Act. The FMLA mandates that employers grant qualified
employees up to twelve workweeks of paid or unpaid leave6 per year for
an employee's illness.7 The ADA requires employers to grant qualified
disabled employees8 a reasonable accommodation unless it would cause the
employer undue hardship to do so.' When an employee falls under the
protection of both provisions, the obligations of the employer are unclear.
[following] factors:
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this [Act];
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision of the
reasonable accommodation; the number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on
expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation
of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the business of
a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, and location
of its facilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the composition,
structure, and finctions of the workforce of such entity; the geographic separateness,
administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered
entity.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(10)(A), I(B) (Supp. V 1993).
5. This hypothetical is a variation on one offered in Brian F. Jackson & Howard R. Flaxman,
Intermittent Leave and Reduced Leave Schedule: Traps for the Unwary under the Family and Medical
Leave Act, 20 EMPLOYEE REL. LJ. 29, 39-40 (1994).
This problem may also arise when cancer patients are hospitalized for extended periods and then
need additional leave for continuing treatment. Ms. Frances Wright testified before a congressional
committee that she took twelve weeks of leave for surgery for colon cancer and was later fired when
she requested additional leave for chemotherapy treatments. S. REP. No. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 12
(1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 14. She had already made every effort to schedule the
appointments on non-work time, and in the ten years she had been working for her employer, she had
only been absent from work two times (three weeks total). Id. According to the testimony before the
Senate, approximately 25% of cancer patients are discriminated against in employment. Id. Ms. Barbara
Hoffman, vice president of the National Coalition for Cancer Survivorship, asserted in the hearings that
"such discrimination against qualified employees costs society millions of dollars in lost wages, lost
productivity and needless disability payments." Id.
6. The FMLA leave can be taken as paid or unpaid leave. 29 C.F.R. § 825.207 (1995). See also
Gerald L. Uslander, From Companies That Have Family Leave: How Costly and Disruptive Is It
Really?, EMPLOYMENT REL TODAY, Spring 1993, at 1. The employee can, and the employer is
permitted, to require that the employee first use his or her paid accrued leave and then take the
remainder of the time as unpaid leave. 29 C.F.R. § 825.207(a) (1995). However, the regulations
specifically state that "[a]n employee has a right to substitute paid medical/sick leave to care for a
seriously ill family member only if the employer's leave plan allows paid leave to be used for that
purpose." Id.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
8. "Qualified individual with a disability" is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. V 1993),
and is further discussed infra, notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(a), 12111(b)(5) (Supp. V 1993).
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INTERACTION OF THE FMLA AND ADA
Once an employer grants twelve weeks of FMLA leave, can the employer
consider the economic and practical effects of having granted that leave in
determining whether an accommodation under the ADA will be an undue
hardship on the employer?
This Note begins by defining and comparing the key terms and
provisions of the FMLA and the ADA. The Note then explains the
reasonable accommodation/undue hardship standard under the ADA and
uses case law to interpret its application. Next, the Note presents arguments
of both employers and employees on whether past FMLA leave should be
considered in the undue hardship test. Finally, the Note concludes that an
employer should not be able to consider past FMLA leave in an ADA
undue hardship test, because doing so would discriminate against
employees for exercising their FMLA rights. Nonetheless, this Note
proposes amendments to the ADA to codify judicial limitations on the
employee's right to a reasonable accommodation after exercising her
FMLA rights.
II. A COMPARISON OF THE KEY TERMS AND PROvIsIoNS OF THE
FMLA AND THE ADA
A. Background on the FMLA and Definition of Terms
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 was enacted to respond to
the changing needs of the American worker who has been forced to choose
between work responsibilities and family health needs.' The FMLA
creates minimum labor standards by mandating that private employers of
at least fifty employees grant twelve workweeks" of family or medical
10. Statement by President William J. Clinton on Signing the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29
WEEKLY COMp. PiRs. Doc. 144-45 (Feb. 8, 1993) [hereinafter Clinton Statement]. Family health needs
include the serious illness of the worker or an immediate family member, and the birth or adoption of
a child or a foster child. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (Supp. V. 1993); see infra note 15. In his statement
upon signing the FMLA, President Clinton stressed that the obligations and needs of the American
worker are dramatically different than in years past. Clinton Statement, supra, at 145. For example, the
number of mothers in the labor force with children under 18 has increased from 35% in 1965 to 67%
in 1992. Id. President Clinton noted that forcing parents to choose between work and family will have
a negative impact on the American working environment. Id. By giving workers more options with
regard to family leave, the FMLA will "promote heightened productivity, lessen[] job turnover, and
reducef] absenteeism." Id.
11. The twelve workweeks of leave can be taken at one time or as "intermittent" or reduced
schedule leave. 29 C.F.R. § 825.203 (1995). If an employee chooses to take such leave, an employer
is permitted to temporarily transfer the employee to an equivalent position with the same salary and
benefits in order to better accommodate the employer's needs. Id. § 825.204. Only the intermittent or
1996]
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leave to employees" who have worked for at least twelve months and
1,250 hours. 13 The FMLA gives employees the right to family and medical
leave for the "serious health condition' 4 of an employee, spouse, child,
reduced leave that is taken is measured into the twelve workweeks calculation. Id. § 825.205(a). See
also Jana H. Carey, Overview and Summary of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, In
ADVANCED EMPLOYMENT LAW AND LITIGATION 1993,231,254 (ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials
No. C874, 1993).
12. The FMLA does not require employers to restore "highly compensated employees" to their
jobs, or even to equivalent positions, if doing so would cause "substantial and grievous" economic
injury to the company and the employer promptly notifies the employee that he or she will not be
reinstated after the leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a), 2614(b) (Supp. V 1993); Carey, supra note 11, at 247-
48. "Highly compensated employees" generally constitute the highest paid 10% of the employees. 29
U.S.C. § 2614(b)(2) (Supp. V 1993); Carey, supra note 11, at 247-48. The FMLA's "substantial and
grievous economic injury" test is stricter and harder to meet than the ADA's "undue hardship" test. 29
C.F.R. § 825.218(d) (1995).
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 261 1(2)(A), 261 1(4)(A), 2612(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993). See generally 29 C.F.R. §
825.100 (1995); Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. & Andrew J. Boling, What You Should Know About the Family
and Medical Leave Act, PRAC. LAW., July 1993, at 21, 22-23; Peggy R. Mastroianni & David K. Fram,
The Family Medical Leave Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act: Areas of Contrast and Overlap,
9 LAB. LAW 553 (1993); Peter M. Panken & Christine L. Wilson, The Family and Medical Leave Act
of 1993, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS IN FEDERAL AND STATE
COURTS 1994, at 923, 925 (ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials No. C902, 1994); John T. Shannon,
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, ARK. LAW., Summer 1993, at 9; G. John Tysee &
Kimberly L. Japinga, The Federal Family and Medical Leave Act: Easily Conceived, Difficult Birth,
Enigmatic Child, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 361, 363 (1994).
14. "Serious health condition" is defined by the FMLA as an illness, injury, impairment, or
physical or mental condition that involves-(A) inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential
medical care facility; or (B) continuing treatment by a health care provider. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11)
(Supp. V 1993); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.800 (1995) (providing a similar definition but expanding the
definition to include subsequent treatment in connection with inpatient care).
A serious health condition involving continuing treatment by a health care provider includes
(A) a period of incapacity ... of more than three consecutive calendar days, including any
subsequent treatment or period of incapacity relating to the same condition, that also involves:
(1) Treatment two or more times by a health care provider,... or
(2) Treatment by a health care provider on at least one occasion which results in a regimen
of continuing treatment under the supervision of the health care provider.
(B) Any period of incapacity due to pregnancy, or for prenatal care.
(C) Any period of incapacity or treatment for such incapacity due to a chronic serious health
condition ....
(D) A period of incapacity which is permanent or long-term due to a condition for which
treatment may not be effective. The employee or family member must be under the continuing
supervision of, but need not be receiving active treatment by, a health care provider ....
(E) Any period of absence to receive multiple treatments... by a health care provider ....
either for restorative surgery after an accident or other injury, or for a condition that would
likely result in a period of incapacity of more than three consecutive calendar days in the
absence of medical intervention or treatment.
29 C.F.R. § 825.800 (1995). Legislative history indicates that "serious health condition" does not
include short-term illnesses with recoveries of only a few days. However, it does include, but is not
limited to,
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or parent, or the birth, adoption, or placement of a child.'" In addition, the
FMLA guarantees an employee continued health benefits during leave and
full job restoration, including salary and benefits, subsequent to leave. 6
The FMLA protects employees who exercise their statutory rights by
prohibiting an employer from interfering with those rights or discriminating
against an employee who contests 7 a practice as a violation of the
FMLA. I8 "Interference" includes an employer's refusal to grant FMLA
heart attacks, heart conditions requiring heart bypass or valve operations, most cancers, back
conditions requiring extensive therapy or surgical procedures, strokes, severe respiratory
conditions, spinal injuries, appendicitis, pneumonia, emphysema, severe arthritis, severe
nervous disorders, injuries caused by serious accidents on or off the job, ongoing pregnancy,
miscarriages, complications or illnesses related to pregnancy, such as severe morning sickness,
the need for prenatal care, childbirth and recovery from childbirth.
H.R. REP. No. 8, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 40 (1993).
15. The FMLA text states that an employee is eligible for 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-
month period for one or more of the following:
(A) Because of the birth of a son or daughter of the employee and in order to care for such
son or daughter.
(B) Because of the placement of a son or daughter with the employee for adoption or foster
care.
(C) In order to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent, of the employee, if such
spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a serious health condition.
(D) Because of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the
functions of the position of such employee.
29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 2614 (Supp. V 1993); 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.209, 825.214 (1995); see generally
Jackson & Flaxman, supra note 5, at 30-31. In comparison, under the ADA the employer need only
make a reasonable accommodation to the employee's disability. See supra note 2 and accompanying
text. If the employer grants the employee leave as a reasonable accommodation to the employee's health
problem, the employer need not restore the employee to the same or equivalent job, nor must the
employer continue to provide health benefits during the employee's absence. Jana H. Carey & Sandra
S. Fink, How the ADA and FMLA Interact with an Employer's Policies Concerning Absenteeism and
Leave Due to Medical Conditions, in ADVANCED EMPLOYMENT LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 11,
at 269, 288-89.
17. Examples of such contests or "opposition" include "complaining to anyone... about allegedly
unlawful practices, participating in a group that opposes discrimination; [or] refusing to obey an order
because the worker thinks it is unlawful under the act." H.R. REP. No. 8, supra note 14, at 46. The
legislative history indicates that the drafters modeled this provision after the "opposition7' clause of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. The Senate Report explains that "the Family and Medical Leave
Act is intended to provide the same sorts of protection [as Title VII] to workers who oppose, protest,
or attempt to correct alleged violations of the FMLA." S. REP. No. 3, supra note 5, at 34, reprinted in
1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 36.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (Supp. V 1993); 29 C.F.R. § 825.220 (1995). The FMLA provides that "[ift
shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to
exercise, any right provided under this subchapter." 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(I) (Supp. V 1993). The FMLA
also prohibits discrimination against employees for exercising their FMLA rights by making it "unlawful
for any employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing
any practice made unlawful by this subchapter." Id. § 2615(a)(2).
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leave and any actions that discourage the taking of such leave.' These
provisions ensure that employees will feel free to exercise their FMLA
rights without fear of retaliation.
B. Background of the ADA and Definitions of Terms
The purpose of the ADA is to prevent discrimination against disabled
employees in hiring and employment.2" In order to merit protection under
the ADA, an employee must be a "qualified individual with a disabili-
ty,"2' an individual "who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
19. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b) (1995). Other examples of interference include employers who try to
avoid FMLA obligations by transferring employees from one worksite to another in order to prevent
any one worksite from employing more than fifty employees. Id. Interference would also include
"changing the essential functions of the job in order to preclude the taking of leave," or reducing
employee hours to prevent FMLA eligibility. Id.
20. The ADA states that "[n]o [employer] shall discriminate against a qualified individual with
a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation,job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. V 1993). Discrimination
includes "not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered
entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of
the business of such covered entity... "'Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
The ADA applies to employers with fifteen or more employees. Id. § 12102(5)(A). Furthermore, it
covers employees irrespective of the length of their employment. Id. § 12112. See also Mastroianni &
Fram, supra note 13, at 554.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(a) (Supp. V 1993). See also EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL,
supra note 2, at S-7. A disability includes "any physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
a major life activity." Carla R. Walworth & Margaret J. Strange, Serving Two Masters: The Interaction
between the Family and Medical Leave Act and the ADA, 18 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 461,467 (1992-93).
Major life activities include "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1995).
The Code of Federal Regulations notes that under the ADA, physical impairments include "[a]ny
physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more
of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory
(including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, gastro-urinary, hemic and lymphatic,
skin, and endocrine." Id. § 1630.2(h)(1). Mental impairments include "[a]ny mental or psychological
disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific
learning disabilities." Id. § 1630.2(h)(2). These lists are not exhaustive but are intended as guidelines.
EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 2, at S-5. A person's condition is a disability
without regard to any medicine the individual may take to control it. Id. Thus, an individual who has
epilepsy but controls the condition with medicine would still have a disability under the ADA. Id. The
Manual specifically notes that "simple physical characteristics ... are not impairments." Id. It is
interesting to note that the ADA protects individuals who are considered to have a disability, even if
the individual does not actually have such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (Supp. V 1993).
The Act defines "disability" to include an individual "being regarded as having such an impairment."
[VOL. 74:283
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perform the essential functions' of the employment position that such
individual holds or desires."
If the employee is a qualified individual with a disability who requests24
a reasonable accommodation under the ADA, the employer is required
to provide an accommodation to enable the employee to perform the job.
In most cases, a reasonable accommodation includes an adjustment in the
facilities or existing job requirements.26 However, under the ADA an
employer is not obliged to provide the accommodation if it would impose
22. "Essential finctions" are defined as the fundamental, nonmarginal requirements of the job. See
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (1995). An employer is only required to accommodate individuals who can
perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12111(8), 12112(a) (Supp. V 1993). Although employers must "reallocate" marginaljob requirements
if necessary to reasonably accommodate employees, the ADA does not require them to reallocate
essential or fundamental job requirements. EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 2, at
S-14. For example, if a security guard must inspect identification cards in order to adequately protect
a building, good vision is an essential function of his job. Id. If his vision is impaired so that he cannot
inspect the cards with or without a reasonable accommodation, then the ADA would not require the
employer to hire the individual. Id. However, if an individual can perform all of the essential job
functions, the employer must reallocate the nonessential functions through job restructuring or job
modification. Id. An employer can restructure a job by "exchanging marginal functions of a job that
cannot be performed by a person with a disability for marginal job functions performed by one or more
other employees." Id. For example, a secretary may be able to perform all the essential functions of her
job but may not be able to perform one nonessential function, such as walking around to deliver papers
to other offices on the floor. The employer could restructure the job by giving the delivery
responsibilities to another secretary while the disabled secretary performed additional typing work in
exchange. See id.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. V 1993).
24. Employers are required to accommodate only the physical or mental limitations ofan otherwise
qualified individual with a disability that are known to the employer. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (1995). The
employer must have knowledge of the employee's disability before it must make a reasonable
accommodation. Carlson v. Inacom Corp., 885 F. Supp. 1314, 1322 (D. Neb. 1995). If the employee
informs the employer about the disability or the employer can reasonably infer the disability from his
knowledge of certain factors, Brink v. Veterans Admin., 4 M.S.P.B. 419, 423, 4 M.S.P.R. 358, 363
(1980), the employer has sufficient knowledge. See id.
25. The requirement that the employer make a "reasonable accommodation" does not mean that
the employer must provide the "best" accommodation or the one the employee prefers; it simply means
that it must be "reasonable." Elliot H. Shaller & Dean A. Rosen, A Guide to the EEOC's Final
Regulations on the Americans with Disabilities Act, 17 EMPLoYEE REL. LJ. 405, 415 (1991-92).
26. Specifically, "reasonable accommodation" includes, but is not limited to:
(i) [m]aking existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities; and
(ii) [j]ob restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules; reassignment to a vacant
position; acquisition or modifications of equipment or devices; appropriate adjustment or
modifications of examinations, training materials, or policies; the provision of qualified
readers or interpreters; and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.
29 C.F.R § 1630.2(o)(2) (1995).
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an undue hardship on the employer to do so.27 An undue hardship is
defined as a burdensome expense in light of "the nature and cost of the
accommodation needed under [the ADA and] the overall financial resources
of the facility.
2 8
If an employer refuses to provide a reasonable accommodation to enable
a qualified individual to perform the essential functions of her job and the
employer does not have a valid undue hardship defense, the employer
engages in "discrimination"29 and violates the ADA." The ADA prohib-
its such workplace discrimination and provides a private right of action for
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1211 l(b)(5)(A) (Supp. V 1993). The undue hardship analysis must be determined
on a case-by-case basis, and the burden rests with the employer to show that the accommodation would
present an undue hardship. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, at 42, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
465. For a discussion of the burden of proof in ADA cases, see infra notes 58-59 and accompanying
text.
Note that an undue hardship defense cannot be justified solely by a negative impact on employee
morale. Shaller & Rosen, supra note 25, at 418; Carey & Fink, supra note 16, at 269, 277. But see
Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1189-90 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (declaring that an adverse effect on employee
morale caused by accommodation to handicapped employee can be considered in determining whether
the accomodation causes undue hardship to the employer).
Another instance in which an employer is not bound by the strictures of the ADA is if the employee
poses a "direct threat" to other employees or customers. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1995). The EEOC dernes
a "direct threat" as a "significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or
others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by the reasonable accommodation." Id. A disabled employee
who poses a "direct threat" to other employees or customers is not a "qualified individual with a
disability" protected by the ADA. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.15(b)(2), 1630.2(a), 1630.2(r) (1995). There
should be a personalized assessment of the individual's ability to safely perform the job. Id. § 1630.2(r).
An evaluation should be based on the most current medical judgment and should include such factors
as:
(1) the duration of the risk;
(2) the nature and severity of the potential harm;
(3) the likelihood that the potential harm will occur, and
(4) the imminence of the potential harm.
Id.
28. For the ADA definition of "undue hardship," see supra note 4.
29. "Discrimination," as used in the ADA, includes, but is not limited to, the following actions:
limiting, segregating and classifying individuals on the basis of disability; contractual arrangements that
have the effect of discriminating against a disabled individual; standards, criteria, or methods of
administration that discriminate against a disabled employee; unequal treatment because of an
individual's relationship or association with an individual with a disability; not making a reasonable
accommodation; qualification standards, tests and other selection criteria which screen out individuals
with disabilities and do not have a business necessity; administration of tests in a manner that
disadvantages disabled individuals; retaliation or coercion against a disabled individual who has opposed
any act or practice made unlawful by the ADA; and medical examinations and inquiries that have no
business necessity and are not job related. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4-1630.14 (1995).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. V 1993).
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such discrimination.3
C. Comparison of the FMLA and the ADA
In many ways, the FMLA provides more inclusive leave than an ADA
reasonable accommodation.32 When an employee requires FMLA leave
due to a medical condition, the employee need not be capable of perform-
ing the essential functions of the job to qualify for such leave. However,
such ability is necessary before an employer can provide an ADA
reasonable accommodation.33 Additionally, because employers do not have
the equivalent of an ADA undue hardship defense, the employer must grant
31. Id. §§ 12112(a), 12112(b), 12117(a). The ADA remedies are the same as Title VII remedies.
Id. § 12117(a). The ADA provides that
[t]he powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in sections 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6,
2000e-8, and 2000e-9 of this title shall be the powers, remedies, and procedures this
subchapter provides to the Commission, to the Attorney General, or to any person alleging
discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of any provision of this chapter, or
regulations promulgated under section 12116 of this title, concerning employment.
Id. § 12117(a). Title VII provides for injunctive and affirmative relief if the employer has "intentional-
ly" discriminated against an employee. Id. § 2000e-5(g). Such affirmative relief "may include, but is
not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay, .. . or any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." Id. Other equitable relief can include removing barriers
to employment, promotion, or ordering an employer to advertise or train. Professor Karen Tokarz,
Lecture at Washington University School of Law, Employment Discrimination Class (Apr. 18, 1995).
Furthermore, plaintiffs can obtain monetary relief, including: (a) backpay, as mentioned above; (b)
limited compensatory damages, which include "future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering,
inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses," 42 U.S.C. §
198la(b) (Supp. V 1993); (c) limited punitive damages if the employer "engaged in a discriminatory
practice ... with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved
individual," id.; and (d) attorneys fees and costs. Id. § 2000e-5(k). However, damages will not be
awarded against employers who engaged in discriminatory practices under the ADA or the
Rehabilitation Act
where the [employer] demonstrates good faith efforts, in consultation with the person with the
disability who has informed the [employer] that accommodation is needed, to identify and
make a reasonable accommodation that would provide such individual with an equally
effective opportunity and would not cause an undue hardship on the operation of the business.
Id. § 1981a(a)(3).
32. However, in some ways FMLA leave is more limiting than ADA leave. First, although the
FMLA provides job and benefits security during the employee's absence, the employee can only take
a maximum of twelve workweeks of leave per year. 29 U.S.C. § 2602(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993). Under the
ADA, there is no similar time limitation. The employer's duty to provide a disabled employee or
applicant with a reasonable accommodation is indefinite, as long as it does not become an undue
hardship. Carey & Fink, supra note 16, at 287. Second, under the FMLA, an employer can demand
medical certification of the employee's or family member's illness. 29 U.S.C. § 2603. However, under
the ADA, the employer cannot request medical certification of the employee's disability, unless the
inquiries are "job-related and consistent with business necessity." Carey & Fink, supra note 16, at 292
(construing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)).
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a) (Supp. V 1993).
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leave to any employee who qualifies for it.34 Lastly, an employer must
grant FMLA leave even if the employee will not be healthy enough to
return after the twelve workweeks of leave.3' As in the hypothetical, both
acts become relevant when an employee takes twelve weeks of FMLA
leave due to the employee's own medical condition, and upon returning to
work, attempts to secure additional leave or a modified work schedule as
a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.36
III. THE ADA REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION STANDARD
A. The Standard and the Undue Hardship Exception
The employer's obligation to make a reasonable accommodation is
limited by the undue hardship exception. Upon gaining knowledge37 of the
employee's disability, the employer has several options.38 For purposes of
this Note, assume that the employer chooses to show that all possible
accommodations pose an undue hardship.39 The phrases "reasonable
accommodation" and "undue hardship" are discussed in conjunction
because undue hardship is the "flip side" of reasonable accommodation; if
an accommodation is not reasonable, it presents an undue hardship.
In establishing the reasonable accommodation requirement, the ADA
34. Mastroianni & Fram, supra note 13, at 555. However, an employer can require the employee
to provide medical certification before granting FMLA leave. 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(a) (1995). This gives
the employer a legitimate way to verify the medical condition without questioning the employee's
integrity. An employer must give an employee notice of the medical certification requirement. Id. Under
certain circumstances, the employer can request recertification at the employee's expense. Id. § 825.308.
35. Carey & Fink, supra note 16, at 286.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1211(9) (Supp. V 1993). Two other interesting questions are: (1) what should an
employer do if she restructures an employee's job as a reasonable accommodation to a disability under
the ADA, and then the employee requests FMLA leave?, Treatment of Serious Illnesses Is Key
Employer Concern, 7 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 1239, 1240 (Dec. 22, 1993); and (2) whether an employer
can consider the fact that some employees are on FMLA leave while making an undue hardship
evaluation for another employee. Carey & Fink, supra note 16, at 292.
37. See supra note 24.
38. The employer could also argue that the employee is not a "qualified individual with a
disability" because the employee does not have a "disability" within the meaning of the ADA, or that
the employee cannot perform the "essential functions" of the job with or without a reasonable
accommodation, or that no reasonable accomodation exists. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1211(8); 12112(a) (Supp.
1988).
39. See id. § 12112(b)(5)(A); see also id. §§ 12111(9), 12111(10) (defining reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship).
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drafters intended to create a "process"4 which would remove obstacles
from an individual's opportunity for equal employment.4" In order to
determine if an accommodation is an undue hardship, the ADA requires
employers to consider a variety of factors42 on a case-by-case basis. The
legislative history indicates that by including a number of factors in the
consideration, the drafters "intend[ed] to establish a flexible approach." '43
In fact, they specifically rejected a strict "ceiling" test" as inappropriate
for determining reasonable accommodation.45 Rather, the employer must
consider the circumstances in light of all the factors and deny only those
accommodations which place "significant difficulty or expense" on the
employer.4
6
Legislative history specifically indicates that the ADA reasonable
accommodation standard places a strong obligation on an employer to
accommodate an employee.47 This is a much higher standard than those
imposed on the employer by previously enacted anti-discrimination acts,
40. H.RL REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 65 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 347-48. The House report states:
The accommodation process focuses on the needs of a particular individual in relation to
problems in performance of a particular job because of a physical or mental impairment. A
problem-solving approach should be used to identify the particular tasks or aspects of the
work environment that limit performance and to identify possible accommodations that will
result in a meaningful equal opportunity for the individual with a disability.
Id., reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 348. This "problem solving approach" includes consulting the
disabled employee, State Vocational Rehabilitation Services agencies, the Job Accommodation Network,
or other employers. Id. at 65-66, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 348.
41. Id. at 65, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 347.
42. See supra note 4.
43. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, at 41, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 464. The factors
approach is "flexible" because the drafters "did not intend to give any single factor particular weight.
Rather, all of the listed factors should be included in an analysis of whether providing an accommoda-
tion would impose an undue hardship on [an employer]." Id. For a list of factors, see supra note 4. The
drafters wanted to model the ADA analysis after the flexible approach of § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988), the disability statute that prohibits the federal government from
discriminating in employment and government programs. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, at 41,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 464.
44. A ceiling test would find an undue hardship per se if the employer had to make an
accommodation that was more than a set percentage of the employee's salary. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. (emphasis added). The House Report indicates that the reasonable accommodation/undue
hardship test presents the employer with a stronger obligation to accommodate than Title I1's "readily
achievable" standard, which regulates the alteration of existing public accommodations. Id. at 42,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 463. The Report also indicates that the ADA standard places a
stronger burden on the employer than the "de minimis" standard of Title VII. Id.
47. See id. at 39-42, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 462-65.
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such as Title VII's "de minimis" test 48 where the employer can refute a
disparate treatment discrimination claim by demonstrating that the statistics
offered by the plaintiff are "inaccurate or insignificant. '49 Thus, the
drafters consciously placed a greater burden on the employer to accommo-
date disabled employees in the ADA than in previous anti-discrimination
legislation.
The drafters realized the importance of an employer's accommodation
obligation and thus placed additional limits on the undue hardship
defense.50 For example, the legislative history notes that the fact that an
accommodation benefits only one individual (such as medical leave) rather
than many (such as a wheelchair ramp) should not have a negative impact
on the reasonable accommodation analysis.5 ' Additionally, the federal
regulations indicate that a reasonable accommodation with a negative
impact on employee morale, standing alone, is insufficient to merit an
undue hardship defense.52
Congress also placed limits upon the employer's undue hardship defense
when outside funds are available53 to cover the entire cost of the accom-
48. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, at 40, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 463.
49. EEOC v. 0 & G Spring & Wire Forms Specialty Co., 38 F.3d 872, 878 (7th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1220 (1995).
50. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 40, at 69, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 351.
51. Id. The legislative history states that "[b]y its very nature, an accommodation should respond
to a particular individual's needs in relation to performance of a specific job at a specific location." Id.
52. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app., § 1630.15(d) (1995). See also Carey & Fink, supra note 16, at 277.
53. For example, subsidies are available through "[s]tate vocational rehabilitation agenc[ies] ...
[flederal, [s]tate or local tax deductions[,] tax credits," or the employee himself. H.R. REP. No. 485,
supra note 40, at 69, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 351-52. An employer must pay for a reasonable
accommodation up to the amount deemed "reasonable," as long as the employee is willing to pay for
the remainder. Id. at 69, reprinted In 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 352. Under this program, which is known
as the "Targeted Job Tax Credit Program," an employer can receive a 40% credit on the first $6,000
per year earned by workers with disabilities. 26 U.S.C. §§ 51(a), 51(b)(3) (Supp. V 1993). For a
discussion of these sections, see John J. Franco, The 'Undue Hardship' Exception to Reasonable
Accommodations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act 9 (May 26,1994) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author). However, the Targeted Job Tax Credit has limited use because it does not apply
to workers who begin work for the employer after December 31, 1994. Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 51(c)(4)
(Supp. V 1993)).
In the hypothetical situation, the Targeted Job Tax Credit is the only tax credit the employer could
use to offset the cost of a reasonable accommodation. Disabled Access Credit, established in § 44 of
the Internal Revenue Code to help small employers meet the costs of ADA compliance, is only
available to employers of less than thirty workers and thereby disqualifies the employer in the
hypothetical, who has 60 employees. 26 U.S.C. § 44(b) (Supp. V 1993). See also Franco, supra, at 8.
Likewise, § 190 of the Internal Revenue Code only gives tax credits for making facilities accessible to
handicapped and the elderly. 26 U.S.C. § 190(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993). For further discussion of the § 190
credit, see Franco, supra, at 9.
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modation or cover the cost beyond what is deemed "reasonable." 54 When
such funding can supplement part of the cost of the accommodation, the
employer can make an undue hardship defense only as to that portion of
the cost not covered by the external source.5 Moreover, an employer may
not use lack of external funding as an excuse for not providing a reasonable
accommodation. 6
B. Case Law Interpreting the Reasonable Accommodation and Undue
Hardship Standards
In order to resolve the conflict between the leave provisions of the
FMLA and the ADA, it is helpful to examine case law interpreting the
reasonable accommodation and undue hardship standards under both the
ADA and its predecessor for government entities, the Rehabilitation Act. 7
Because there is little case law on FMLA leave, it is appropriate to draw
an analogy between the effect of previously granted FMLA leave on the
undue hardship defense and the effect of previously granted ADA leave on
the undue hardship defense. Therefore, this Note examines cases in which
employers provided several reasonable accommodations and then refused
to provide more accommodations, relying on their previous unsuccessful
attempts to accommodate the employee.
Under the reasonable accommodation analysis, the plaintiff has the initial
burden of requesting, an accommodation and establishing a prima facie
showing that the reasonable accommodation is possible. 8 If the employer
54. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 40, at 69, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 110-11 (1990).
55. Id.
56. Id., reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 352.
57. Both the text and the legislative history of the ADA indicate that the reasonable accommoda-
tion and undue hardship standards should be interpreted consistently with §§ 501, 503 & 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.42 U.S.C. § 12117(b) (Supp. V 1993); H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, supra note
40, at 62, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 344; H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 2, at 40, reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 462-63. Id. at 106; 42 U.S.C. § 12107(b). The Rehabilitation Act prohibits
discrimination against qualified government employees with a disability and requires the government
to make a reasonable accommodation. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Cases
decided under the Rehabilitation Act have precedential value to ADA determinations. See, e.g., Chandler
v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1391 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1386 (1994); Stradley v.
LaFourche Communications, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 442, 443 n.1 (E.D. La. 1994).
58. See, e.g., Arneson v. Heckler, 879 F.2d 393, 396 (8th Cir. 1989) (interpreting the
Rehabilitation Act). See also Shaller & Rosen, supra note 25, at 415 (noting that the burden is on the
employee to request a reasonable accommodation). A plaintiff (or the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission suing on behalf of the disabled employee) must also initially establish that:
(I) the respondent fits the definition of a "covered entity,"
(2) the charging party is:
1996]
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is not willing to provide the accommodation, the burden then shifts to the
employer to show either that the employee cannot perform the "essential
functions" of the job with or without reasonable accommodation, or that
such accommodation would be an "undue hardship."59
Although no court has considered the effect of FMLA leave on the ADA
undue hardship analysis, at least one court refused to allow an employee to
continuously demand ADA accommodations from an employer when he
(a) "disabled," within the meaning of the ADA;
(b) is [sic] "qualified," i.e., meets the skill, education and other requirements of the
job, and is able to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without
accommodation; and
(c) there is a nexus between the [charging party's] disability and the adverse
employment action.
ORGANIZATION RESOURCES COUNSELORS, INc., ADA TRAINING MANUAL 57 (1992) [hereinafter ADA
TRAINING MANUAL]. See alfo, 29 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12111(8) (Supp. V 1993).
59. See, e.g., Arneson, 879 F.2d at 396. The traditional disparate treatment framework provides
a rebuttable presumption in favor of plaintiffs who have only circumstantial evidence of discrimination.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (applying disparate treatment framework to
prove racial discrimination and explaining that disparate treatment claims presume an underlying
discriminatory intent). See, e.g. Carson v. Scott Paper Co., 834 F. Supp. 33, 36 (D. Me. 1993).
First, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of discrimination by demonstrating:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority;
(ii) that he applied and was qualified for ajob for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and
(iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
Green, 411 U.S. at 802. Upon such a showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a
nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action. Id. Lastly, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff
to prove that the defendant's stated reasons were merely pretextual. Id. at 804.
The Green framework is adaptable to ADA analysis. Indeed, the Court noted that the listed
specification of prima facie proof may vary in differing factual situations Id. at 802 n.13. First, the
plaintiff must meet his initial prima facie burden. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. Next, the
defendant may state a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the failure to accommodate. ADA
TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 58, at 60. For example, in an individual disparate treatment case, a
defendant can state that the plaintiff was not promoted because he was not as qualified as the selected
employee. Id. The burden then returns to the plaintiff to prove that the stated reason was pretextual. Id.
In other words, the plaintiff can prove that the promoted employee was not more qualified than the
plaintiff, that the discriminatory policy is not job related, or that the plaintiff can be reasonably
accommodated. See id.
Employers can also defend against charges of discriminatory "disparate impact" practices. Disparate
impact practices or policies are those that, although not adopted for discriminatory reasons, have a
disparate, and negative, impact upon the protected class-here, disabled employees. See Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-32 (1971); see also, e.g., Carson, 834 F. Supp. at 36. Employers can
defend against such claims by proving that "the policy [or] practice in question is job related and
consistent with business necessity[,] and reasonable accommodation is impossible." ADA TRAINING
MANUAL, supra note 58, at 65.
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could not perform the job with the accommodations." In Gallagher v.
Catto," the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia suggested
that if an employee-plaintiff abuses his right to a reasonable accommoda-
tion, the court will consider previous leave grants as a factor in the
reasonable accommodation analysis. 2
In Gallagher, the employer provided a series of reasonable accommoda-
tions to an alcoholic employee over a ten-year period of employment.6'
The leave included at least nine long-term detoxification programs and a
"firm choice" agreement in which the employee agreed to be in daily
contact with an Alcoholics Anonymous mentor.' After the employer
provided the employee with many reasonable accommodations and the
employee repeatedly failed to remain sober and productive at work, the
employer discharged the employee.6' The employee then sued the
employer under the Rehabilitation Act, claiming the employer failed to
make a reasonable accommodation for the employee's disability.66 The
district court considered the previous leave grants by the employer in
deciding that, under these circumstances, additional leave would be an
undue hardship under the Rehabilitation Act.67
60. See Gallagher v. Catto, 778 F. Supp. 570 (D.D.C. 1991), aff'd, 988 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir.
1993). Because FMLA is a recent law, there is little case law on the interaction of FMLA and ADA
leave. Gallagher is an excellent example of some of the issues courts will face in determining whether
to consider prior FMLA leave in an ADA undue hardship analysis, an issue no court has yet addressed.
Gallagher is analogous in that it is the only case wherein the court considered whether to include prior
disability leave (albeit ADA rather than FMLA) in undue hardship analysis. See id.
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 573.
64. Id. at 572-76.
65. Id. at 576.
66. Id. at 572.
67. Id. at 579 n.13, 581-82. Robinson v. Hamline Univ., No. C4-93-2074, 1994 WL 175019
(Minn. Ct. App. May 10, 1994), is also persuasive. In Robinson, a dismissed law student claimed
Hamline University violated the Minnesota anti-discrimination statute, MINN. STAT. § 363.03(5)(1)
(1988), by failing to reasonably accommodate his disability. 1994 WL 175019, at *1. The court, looking
to the federal Rehabilitation Act for guidance, held that because the disabled student was unable to
perform the requirements of the law school curriculum (the "essential functions" of his job in the
terminology of the ADA), even after the accommodations made by the school, he was not "otherwise
qualified" for Hamline's law school, and that the university had met its obligation of reasonable
accommodation. Id. at *2-5.
Although the Robinson case occurs in the admissions context, and deals with a public accommoda-
tion, it is analogous to the employment context because, using similar language, the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act require reasonable accommodations in employment and public services. Compare
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) with 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (Supp. V 1993). In addition, many state human rights
laws are similar to the Rehabilitation Act. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 363.03 (1988). Mr. Robinson brought
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The result in Gallagher is factually distinguishable from our hypothetical
scenario. In Gallagher, the employer did have an initial duty to accommo-
date the employee." However, once the employee abused that right, the
court found that the employer no longer had a duty to accommodate.69
The employer's obligation to make a reasonable accommodation continues
only until the employee begins to abuse that right.7" In the introductory
hypothetical, the employee took one twelve week period of FMLA leave;
this should not be considered an abuse of the employee's FMLA rights.7'
Gallagher underscores the need to place some limits on the employee's
rights in order to avoid abuse of the anti-discrimination laws. Gallagher
also demonstrates that courts should not require an employer to continue
to make reasonable accommodations when those efforts are fruitless and the
employee starts to take undue advantage of the employer's compliance with
the ADA.
In interpreting the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, courts have found
many instances in which forcing an employer to provide an accommodation
would constitute an undue hardship.72 One set of cases found that regular
attendance is an "essential function" of many jobs and an inability to report
his claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), which contains language prohibiting
educational institutions from discriminating against persons with disabilities, almost identical to the
language of the Rehabilitation Act. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988) with Minn. Stat. § 363.03, subd.
5(1) (1988). In fact, in interpreting provisions of the MHRA, the Robinson court correctly relied on
federal case law interpreting the Rehabilitation Act because no MHRA case law existed. 1994 WL
175019, at *2. Thus, the MHRA and the Rehabilitation Act can be interpreted analogously.
The hypothetical posited in the introduction is distinguishable from cases such as Gallagher and
Robinson, because with a reasonable accommodation, the employee could perform the essential
functions of the job. In Robinson, the court established that a reasonable accommodation will be
sufficient as a matter of law if the employer considered "altemative means, their feasibility, cost and
effect... and came to a rational decision." Id. at *4 (citing Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Medicine,
932 F.2d 19, 26 (1st Cir. 1991)). Under this type of test, our employee would have a harder case,
because a court could find that the employer's decision to consider past FMLA leave is a rational
decision under the circumstances.
68. Gallagher, 778 F. Supp. at 577.
69. Id. at 581-82.
70. See id.
71. However, ifour hypothetical employee had demanded and taken twelve weeks of FMLA leave
each and every year for the previous three years (supposing the FMLA had been in effect for three
years), and upon returning from each leave, requested an ADA reasonable accommodation, the result
might be similar to the Gallagher court's conclusion. This, of course, depends on the severity of the
employee's abuse of the leave provisions. The employee may have legitimate reasons for taking leave
each year, and it may have been coincidental that these personal health problems occurred
consecutively.
72. See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
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to work at regular hours may place an undue hardship on an employer.73
Other courts have found an undue hardship when the accommodation
would require the employer to change the way the organization func-
tions.74 Lastly, courts do not require an employer to accommodate an
employee when such accommodation would pose a health or safety threat
to the employee or others.75 These cases demonstrate that the courts will
find an undue hardship when accommodation is unduly costly, disruptive
or unsafe. Thus, the courts provide necessary checks on the reasonable
accommodation standard to insure that employees do not take undue
advantage of their rights.
There are significantly fewer cases in which the courts have found that
an accommodation was not an undue hardship on the employer or that the
employer failed to provide a reasonable accommodation.76 In Arneson v.
Heckler,77 the Eighth Circuit found that the Social Security Administration
did not fully examine all the reasonable accommodations it could provide
73. See Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 529-30 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding that specific hours were an
essential function of clerk's job in U.S. Attorney's Office because the office had to meet a 4 p.m.
deadline each day); Jackson v. Veteran's Admin., 22 F.3d 277, 278-79 (11 th Cir. 1994) (finding that
housekeeper in hotel who could not keep regular hours could not perform the essential functions of the
job and it would be an undue hardship on employer to keep him employed); Walders v. Garrett, 765
F. Supp. 303, 312-14 (E.D. Va. 1991) (finding that frequent and unpredictable absence presented an
undue hardship when the job entailed time deadlines and budget constraints).
74. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979) (finding that it is an
undue hardship on an employer to provide an accommodation that substantially changes the nature of
the job or lowers the standards of the school or workplace); Wood v. School Dist. of Omaha, 25 F.3d
667 (8th Cir. 1994) (upholding the district court's finding that it would be an undue hardship on the
employer of a school van driver suffering from diabetes mellitus to provide the disabled driver
sufficient accommodations to avert the risk posed to the driver or passengers by sudden hypoglycemic
reaction); Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1187-88 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (finding that the Rehabilitation Act did
not require an overseas radio station operated by the U.S. Information Agency to accommodate an
insulin-dependent diabetic applicant because the individual could only be accommodated at three of the
twelve posts worldwide and it would place an undue strain on the limited number of employees in the
same job).
75. See Wood, 25 F.3d 667; see also Huber v. Howard County, Md., 849 F. Supp. 407, 414 (D.
Md. 1994) (accommodating firefighter with asthma was a health threat and thus an undue hardship
because he depended on an inhaler which became ineffective and possibly explosive under high
temperatures); Serrapica v. New York, 708 F. Supp. 64, 73 (S.D.N.Y.) (accommodating a garbage truck
operator with diabetes was an undue hardship because the employee was irresponsible in caring for his
disease and thus posed a safety risk to himself and those around him), aftd, 888 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.
1989).
76. See, e.g., Arneson v. Heckler, 946 F.2d 90 (8th Cir. 1991).
77. Id. For a lengthier examination of the facts and issues of this case, see Arneson v. Heckler,
879 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1989), wherein the Eighth Circuit had previously reversed and remanded the
first district court decision in favor of the defendant employer.
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for a claims representative -who had apraxia, a disorder that made him
easily distracted and unable to concentrate because of activity around
him.7" The employer had previously accommodated the employee under
the Rehabilitation Act by relocating the employee's desk to a quieter area,
giving him a telephone headset to allow him to have his hands free, and
providing him with assistance in organizing his work.79 However, when
the employee was transferred to a new office and received comparable
accommodations, his work performance became unsatisfactory."0 The
Social Security Administration refused to provide further accommodation,
presumably because it thought that additional accommodations would be
unduly costly and disruptive." The Eighth Circuit disagreed, ordering the
federal government to provide the necessary reasonable accommodations.82
The court found that regardless of the expense and hassle incurred in
providing the previous accommodations, the employer had a continuing
duty to provide the employee with additional accommodations.83
The cases in which the courts have found an undue hardship show that
the judiciary places checks on the employee's ability to obtain opportunistic
leave under the ADA; the courts will not permit employees to take
advantage of employers. Also, the courts will not require employers to
continue to accommodate employees who can no longer perform the
"essential functions" of the job.
IV. EMPLOYERS VS. EMPLOYEES: SHOULD FMLA LEAVE BE
CONSIDERED IN THE UNDUE HARDSHIP TEST?
A. Employer's Argument
Employers have two effective arguments that prior FMLA leave should
be considered in an undue hardship evaluation under the ADA. First,
providing the employee with twelve weeks of FMLA leave was a
reasonable accommodation, and therefore the employer's obligation under
the ADA has been completely satisfied." In other words, there is no need
to continue an ADA analysis. Second, an undue hardship evaluation must
78. 946 F.2d at 92.
79. Id. at 91.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 92.
82. Id. at 92-93.
83. Id.
84. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
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include the overall financial status of the employer, including the fact that
the employee has just taken twelve weeks of FMLA leave, and it is
unrealistic to ignore this fact when evaluating an employee's request for
further leave as a reasonable accommodation. 5 Thus, the employer
acknowledges that the ADA applies but argues that providing additional
leave as an accommodation would be an undue hardship.
1. FMLA Leave Per Se Satisfies the ADA Reasonable Accommodation
Standard
An employer's ideal and simplest argument is that granting FMLA leave
per se satisfies the employer's obligations under the ADA. In other words,
when an employee takes twelve weeks of federally mandated FMLA leave,
the employer has satisfied the ADA requirement that it make a reasonable
accommodation, and thus the granting of any further accommodation would
be an undue hardship as a matter of law. 6 This argument allows the
employer to avoid the entire undue hardship analysis. By arguing that
FMLA leave per se satisfies the reasonable accommodation obligation, the
employer could easily win its case on summary judgment.8 7
85. See infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
86. This is the argument proposed by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Treatment of Serious
Illnesses Is Key FMLA Employer Concern, supra note 36, at 1240. The group argued to the Department
of Labor that "providing leave should discharge an employer's obligations under both laws." Id. But
see Maatman & Boling, supra note 13, at 30 (stating that "[c]ompliance with the ADA is independent
of compliance with the [FMLA]).
The Society for Human Resource Management, along with other employer representatives, expressed
indignation at the multitude of obligations with which they must comply under the FMLA and the
ADA. See Treatment of Serious Illnesses Is Key FMLA Employer Concern, supra note 36, at 1240.
These employer representatives argue that if, by granting FMLA leave, an employer satisfies its
reasonable accommodation requirement, employers could better handle the voluminous obligations of
these two rules. See id.
87. But see 29 C.F.R. § 825.702 (1995) (answering the question: "How does FMLA affect Federal
and State anti-discrimination laws?"). Apparently, this view has not been adopted by the Department
of Labor or the EEOC, whose guidelines state that "the leave provisions of the [FMLA] are wholly
distinct from the reasonable accommodation obligations of employers covered under the [ADAJ." Id.
§ 825.702(a) (citing S. REP. No. 3, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. 38 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 40). However, the regulations next state that "[a]n employer must therefore provide leave under
whichever statutory provision provides the greater rights to employees," thus possibly implying that
employees only reap the benefits of one of the anti-discrimination statutes, not both. Id.
Accordingly, the EEOC's opinion on how to read the FMLA and the ADA together is unclear. See
also id. § 825.702(c) (providing examples and seemingly approving the grant of leave as an ADA
reasonable accommodation to be simultaneously considered FMLA leave). In the Interim Final
Regulations, the Department of Labor states situations where the two acts must be satisfied
independently. BURYAu OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT: THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE
ACT OF 1993: INTERIM FINAL REGULATIONS S-5 (1993) [hereinafter INTERIM FINAL REGULATIONS].
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2. Previous FEMLA Leave Is Crucial to an Undue Hardship Analysis.
An employer's next best argument is that it can take the economic
burden of previous FMLA leave into consideration in deciding whether to
grant additional leave as a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. 8
Under the ADA, an employer can consider its "overall financial resources"
in determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on it.89 If FMLA leave has been taken, the employer cannot help
but calculate the financial impact of that leave into future requests for
accommodations.9" Because FMLA leave will undoubtably affect the
overall financial resources of a smaller employer, this argument is
particularly persuasive for smaller employers.91
The reasoning behind this argument is that, realistically, it would be
nearly impossible to independently evaluate an employee's request for leave
as a reasonable accommodation after the employee has just taken twelve
weeks of continuous or sporadic FMLA leave at great expense to the
employer.92 It will be difficult for the employer to "ignore" the substantial
financial and organizational impact of the employee's twelve week absence
on the employer.93
For example, it warns against firing an employee who is a substance abuser without first ensuring that
the employer is not retaliating against the employee for taking FMLA leave and that the employer is
complying with the ADA. Id.
88. Carey & Fink, supra note 16, at 291-92. Carey and Fink suggest that previous grants of
FMLA leave to the employee or other employees should be considered in an undue hardship analysis
because the ADA permits the employer to factor in "the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact
otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the facility." Id. at 292 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(10) (Supp. V 1993)); see also Mastroianni & Frain, supra note 13, at 556-57 (indicating that
employers have a strong argument that previous FMLA leave has an impact on an employer's resources,
which must be considered in an ADA undue hardship evaluation).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(10)(B)(iii) (Supp. V 1993).
90. Mastroianni & Fram, supra note 13, at 557.
91. In fact, one attorney with expertise in ADA cases argues that there are few reasonable
accommodations that would constitute an undue hardship for employers. David Newberger, Speech to
Washington University Employment Discrimination Class (April 6, 1995). Most reasonable
accommodations of a physical nature such as a braille typewriter or a wheelchair ramp cost under
$16,000. Id. Leave accommodations may be more costly.
92. See Mastroianni & Fram, supra note 13, at 556-57.'
93. Id. For example, congressional opponents of the FMLA bill noted that the workplace can
become "chaotic" and unproductive when a secretary is out on leave. H.R. REP. No. 8, supra note 14,
at 66 (reporting minority views). Carey & Fink, supra note 16, at 291. With regard to the fact that
employees on FMLA leave have more rights than employees on ADA leave, Carey and Fink argue that
job benefits while on FMLA leave are mandated by federal statute. Id. The authors stress the need for
independent evaluation of employees' ADA and FMLA rights by stating that "the fact that an employer
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Lastly, employers will urge that evaluating a reasonable accommodation
request separate from previous FMLA leave invites abuse by opportunistic
employees at the expense of the employer.94 In theory, an employee could
take twelve weeks of FMLA leave every twelve months and then return
each time to demand more leave as a reasonable accommodation under the
ADA. Employers fear that each year, an employee could demand that the
employer ignore previously granted FMLA leave when determining whether
a given accommodation is an undue hardship.
B. Employee ' s Argument
An employee who genuinely finds herself in the position of needing both
FMLA leave and a reasonable accommodation under the ADA will argue
that her employer cannot consider her recent exercise of FMLA rights in
an undue hardship analysis.95 The employee has five major sources of
support. First, the policy objectives and purposes of both the FMLA and
the ADA lend support to the employee's argument.96 Second, the employ-
ee has statutory support for this argument in both the FMLA and the
ADA.97 Third, the employee's arguments are strengthened by the FMLA's
confidentiality requirement with regard to medical information.98 Fourth,
a comparison of the FMLA to state medical leave laws bolsters the
employee's argument.9 Fifth, the employee's argument is enhanced by the
exposure of employers' FMLA fears as baseless."°
1. Policy Objectives of the ADA and the FMLA
An employee can look to the policy objectives behind the ADA and the
provides greater rights to employees on FMLA leave should be of no relevance to the issue of whether
it would be an undue hardship to provide those benefits to individuals on ADA leave as well." Id.
94. INTERIM FINAL REGULATIONS, supra note 87, at S-9 to S-10. Willie Washington, of the
California Manufacturers Association, "predicted that the FMLA will make employees view the leave
'as an entitlement.' Employees may feel that they should take leave whether they need it or not." Id.
95. See Mastroianni & Fram, supra note 13, at 556; see also Carey & Fink, supra note 16, at 287
(stating that after exhausting the twelve weeks of FMLA leave, an employee may still be entitled to
additional leave under the ADA). The ADA may govern an employer's obligations when an employee
returns from FMLA leave. See Jean C. Gaskill & John A. Ricca, Americans with Disabilities Act: An
Analysis of Developments and Potential Statutory Conflicts, in EMPLOYMENT LAW 1993, 495, 607 (PLI
Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 476, 1993).
96. See infra notes 101-21 and accompanying text.
97. See infra notes 122-42 and accompanying text.
98. See infra notes 143-50 and accompanying text.
99. See infra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
100. See infra notes 157-63 and accompanying text.
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FMLA to support her argument. The policy objectives are: (1) the
independence... of the FMLA and the ADA rights, and the preservation
of the employees' rights as separate protections; e 2 and (2) the differing
philosophies of the FMLA (minimum labor standards for family and
medical leave)' 3 and the ADA (prohibition of discrimination against
disabled employees)." 4
The FMLA and the ADA grant distinct and separate rights to protected
individuals.'0 5 There is evidence that Congress intended the acts to be
interpreted independently. 0 6 The FMLA states that "nothing in this Act
... shall be construed to modify or affect any Federal... law prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of race, religion, color, national origin, sex, age,
or disability.' 0 7 Legislative interpretation of this clause indicates that the
FMLA leave requirements are "wholly distinct from the reasonable
accommodation obligations of employers covered under the Americans
With Disabilities Act."'0 8 The House Report further indicates that the
purpose of the FMLA is "not to limit already existing rights and
protections."' 0 9 Employment attorneys warn that "[e]mployers should not
assume that they have fulfilled their ADA obligations by offering a
disabled employee 12 weeks of [FMLA] leave."" ' In fact, federal
101. Independence, as used in this Note, means that if an employee exercises his or her rights under
one act, it should not affect the employee's ability to exercise his or her rights under the other act.
102. See H.R. REP. No. 8, supra note 14, at 49.
103. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (Supp. V 1993).
104. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (Supp. V 1993).
105. See H.R. REP. No. 8, supra note 14, at 49.
106. Id. See also infra notes 109-10, 113.
107. 29 U.S.C. § 2651(a) (Supp. V 1993). However, the EEOC regulations accompanying the
FMLA detract from the independence argument. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.310(b) (1995). After FMLA leave
is taken, an employee's "retum-to-work" physical must be "job-related and consistent with business
necessity" so that the medical examination is consistent with the ADA. Id. In addition, an employer may
require "fitness-for-duty" medical certification "only with regard to the particular health condition that
caused the employee's need for FMLA leave." Id. § 825.310(c). This provision hurts the independence
argument because the FMLA ensures that its medical certification requirement complements the ADA.
108. S. REP. No. 3, supra note 5, at 38, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 40.
109. H.R. REP. No. 8, supra note 14, at 49. In addition, the FMLA does not affect any rights under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the Rehabilitation Act. Id. See also HELEN D. IRVIN &
RALPH M. SILBERMAN, FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVES: THE NEw FEDERAL STATUTE AND STATE LAWS
29 (1993). In a similar vein, the FMLA does not alter an employer's obligations with regard to a
collective bargaining agreement or an employment benefit program that provides more thorough leave
provisions than the FMLA. Id. at 30.
110. Maatman & Boling, supra note 13, at 30. Federal regulations also state that employers may
be subject to additional ADA requirements independent of a previous grant of FMLA leave. 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.702 (1995). Specifically, the regulations explain that after an employee exhausts FMLA leave and
is unable to "perform an essential function of the position because of a physical or mental condition,
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regulations note that if an employer is making a reasonable accommodation
for an employee, the employee may nonetheless take FMLA leave."' The
regulations also emphasize that "disability" under the ADA and "serious
health condition" under the FMLA are "different concepts, and must be
analyzed separately... 2
The FMLA and the ADA are also independent with regard to compliance
obligations."t 3 Compliance with one act is independent of compliance
with the other act, and different agencies bear the enforcement responsibili-
ties.14 The EEOC is responsible for enforcing the ADA, and it is
empowered to investigate claims and bring suits in its own name against
an employer." 5 On the other hand, the Secretary of Labor investigates
FMLA complaints in a "compliance review" and commences court
proceedings against an employer if it finds a violation of the FMLA. t'6
In addition, the FMLA and the ADA rest upon different philosophical
foundations." 7 An employee can accordingly assert that the FMLA and
the ADA have distinct purposes and underlying goals. Whereas the ADA
prevents discrimination in the workplace on the basis of disability,"' the
FMLA provides minimum labor standards for family and medical leave
without forcing employees to choose between the "demands of the
workplace""' 9 and the "needs of families."'20 Thus, employee rights
... the employer's obligations may be governed by the Americans with Disabilities Act." Id. §
825.214(b); see also Carey & Fink, supra note 16, at 287.
111. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(b) (1995).
112. Id.
113. Maatman & Boling, supra note 13, at 30. For example, when both the FMLA and the ADA
are applicable, maintenance of medical records must meet the separate confidentiality requirements of
both acts. 29 C.F.R. § 825.500(g) (1995). Medical records are important to this discussion because in
order for an employee to prove that she has a "serious health condition" within the meaning of the
FMLA or a "disability" within the meaning of the ADA, the employee must provide medical records
to substantiate her condition. Id. §§ 825.305(a), 1630.14 (1995).
114. Carey and Fink, supra note 16, at 279, 291 (noting that the Secretary of Labor enforces the
FMLA and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission enforces the ADA).
115. 29 C.F.R. § 1640.6.
116. See, WAGE & HOUR Div., DEPARTMENT OF LAB. FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT OF 1993:
SUMMARY OF OUTREACH/COMPLIANCE AcTIvrTY (June30, 1995) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF ACTIVITY];
42 U.S.C. § 12107(b).
117. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text; Mastroianni & Fram, supra note 13, at 553-54.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (Supp. V 1993). The ADA text states that the purpose of the act is
to "provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals
with disabilities." Id. See also Mastroianni & Fram, supra note 13, at 553-54.
119. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(bXl) (Supp. V 1993).
120. Id. See also Mastroianni & Fram, supra note 13, at 553-54. In his statement upon signing the
FMLA, President Clinton stated that it was unfair for Americans to have to choose between "continuing
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under these two acts must remain distinct in order to preserve the
maximum protection that Congress intended for employees. If employers
blur the distinction between these two rights, they deprive employees of the
full benefit of Congress' intended protections. By treating FMLA leave as
a factor in granting ADA leave, employers could unfairly avoid their
responsibilities to provide for their employees and evade their legal
responsibilities under the acts. The differing philosophies of the two acts
underscore the need for independent evaluation of ADA accommodations
from previously granted FMLA leave.'
2. FMLA and ADA Statutory Support
Four FMLA provisions lend statutory support to employee arguments
that the exercise of FMLA rights should not be a factor in an undue
hardship analysis. First, the FMLA contains an "anti-retaliation" clause 2 2
that prohibits employer "interfere[nce] with" an individual's FMLA rights
and prohibits "discrimination" against an individual "for opposing any
practice made unlawful by [the FMLA]."' The presence of this clause
emphasizes the importance of ensuring that employees are able to exercise
their FMLA rights without fear of retaliation. Counting FMLA leave in an
undue hardship evaluation discourages the use of such leave and is likely
their employment" and "tending to their own health." Clinton Statement, supra note 10, at 144-45. The
purpose of the FMLA is to encourage a "reciprocal commitment between employer and employee" in
order to deal with family and medical crises. Id. In the end, this will provide support for workers and
help employers by fostering increased productivity, lower turnover rates, and reduced absenteeism. Id.
121. This philosophical difference accounts for the different leave accommodations for an impaired
or ill employee under the two acts. See Mastroianni & Fram, supra note 13, at 553-54; Carey & Fink,
supra note 16, at 287. Also note how the same circumstances result in different types of leave or
accommodation under the two acts. For examples of such variances, see Carey & Fink, supra note 16.
122. For a discussion of the anti-retaliation provision, see Carey, supra note 1 , at 259. Carey states
that the FMLA's "anti-retaliation" clause means that
[i]t is unlawful for an employer to interfere, restrain, or deny the exercise of rights given
under the FMLA. It is also unlawful for an employer to discriminate or to retaliate against
employees for taking advantage of their rights to family and medical leave or opposing the
employer's denial of those rights.
14.
123. 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (Supp. V 1993). The FMLA reads:
Prohibited Acts
(a) Interference with rights
(1) Exercise of rights - It shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or
deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this subchapter.
(2) Discrimination - It shall be unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other manner
discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by this
subchapter.
Id. See also Carey & Fink, supra note 16, at 281.
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to constitute an interference with FMLA rights.1 24
Second, the FMLA protects an employee who has taken leave by
mandating full restoration or maintenance of his job and employmenit
benefits." s The FMLA job security includes restoration to an "equiva-
lent" position,2 6 the restoration of employment benefits accrued prior to
leave, 27 the maintenance of health insurance coverage during leave," 8
and a prohibition against using FMLA leave to an employee's disadvantage
in a "no-fault" absenteeism policy. 9 Legislative history indicates that
124. Carey & Fink, supra note 16, at 291-92.
125. 29 U.S.C. § 2614 (Supp. V 1993). The FMLA's "Employment and Benefits Protection" section
provides:
(a) Restoration to Position
(1) In general - Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any eligible employee
who takes leave under section 2612 of this title for the intended purpose of the leave shall
be entitled, on return from such leave -
(A) to be restored by the employer to the position of employment held by the employee when
the leave commenced; or
(B) to be restored to an equivalent position with equivalent employment benefits, pay, and
other terms and conditions of employment.
(2) Loss of benefits - The taking of leave under section 2612 of this title shall not result in
the loss of any employment benefit accrued prior to the date on which the leave commenced.
Id. § 2614(a). Section (b) exempts the highest paid 10% of the employer's workforce from the scope
of the mandatory restoration requirement. Id. § 2614(b).
126. "Equivalent" position means that the new job must have the "same duties, terms, conditions
and status." Shannon, supra note 13, at 11. Shannon explains that "[r]estoration to a less than equivalent
position would deter employees from exercising their FMLA rights." Id. Congress noted that
"equivalence" does not mean "similarity" or "comparability," but is a stricter standard requirifg
"correspondence to the duties and other terms, conditions and privileges of an employee's previous
position." S. REP. No. 3, supra note 5, at 30, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 32. The employer must
return the employee to an "equivalent position" with "equivalent benefits" even if "the employee has
been replaced or his or her position has been restructured to accommodate the employee's absence."
29 C.F.R. § 825.214(a) (1995).
127. Shannon, supra note 13, at 11. However, an employer is not required to grant an employee
seniority or employment benefits that would have accrued during FMLA leave. Id. Also, the employee
is not entitled to unemployment compensation. Id.
128. An employer is required to continue to provide equivalent health coverage during an
employee's FMLA leave. 29 C.F.R. § 825.209 (1995); Carey, supra note 11, at 245. If the employer
makes the coverage payments, then the employer is required to continue such payments. Id. If the
employee contributes to or pays the entire coverage payments, the employer is entitled to require that
the employee continue to pay the premiums. Id. If the employee defaults on these payments, the
employer must continue coverage for 30 days, and only after that time can the employer cease coverage.
Id. However, this does not relieve the employer of its obligation to fully restore health coverage wheri
the employee returns to work. Id
129. Jackson & Flaxman, supra note 5, at 36. In "no-fault" absenteeism policies, all absences re
treated alike. Id. In other words, a "legitimate" sickness absence counts the same as an illegitimate
absence. Id. Employers usually institute such a policy in order to combat chronic absenteeism and the
resultant morale problems. Id. In this way, employers "eliminate claims of discriminatory or subjective
enforcement." Id. The FMLA actually forces employers to except FMLA leave from such no-fault
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Congress considered the job and benefits security as "central to the
entitlement provided in [the FMLA]."' 0 The drafters intended to prevent
employers from punishing employees who exercised their federally
mandated FMLA rights.13 If an employer could penalize an employee for
taking FMLA leave, it would frustrate the Act's effectiveness and violate
the intent and spirit of the FMLA.1
3 1
Third, the drafters placed a high priority on FMLA rights by providing
generous remedies for an employee who has been discriminated against for
exercising FMLA rights. Specifically, it provides the plaintiff with double
damages plus interest for lost wages, salary, or employment benefits denied
by an employer acting without "good faith.' In addition, if the employee
proves discrimination, the employee recovers attorney's fees, expert witness
fees, and costs. 134
Fourth, the FMLA's special rules for employees of local educational
agencies suggest that FMLA obligations are supplementary to employer
obligations under other disability acts. 35 The FMLA states that public
schools do not automatically "violate" the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 by granting
FMLA leave.1 36 Congress has interpreted this provision to mean that by
merely granting FMLA leave, educational institutions do not violate the
disability acts. 37 The drafters warned schools that granting employees
policies. Id. The FMLA places such high importance on preventing employer retaliation that it does not
permit employers to count FMLA leave under no-fault policies. Id. Jackson and Flaxman argue that this
"statutory entitlement to short-term absences" weakens the ability of employers to "promote good
attendance and efficiency." Id.
130. H.R. REP. No. 8, supra note 14, at 41. The drafters noted that "employees would be greatly
deterred from taking leave without the assurance that upon return from leave, they will be reinstated
to a genuinely equivalent position." Id. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 825.214-825.220 (1995).
131. Shannon, supra note 13, at 10.
132. In his article on the FMLA, John Shannon remarks that "[tihe general entitlement to family
and medical leave is of little value if the employer may impose a cost on the employee's exercise of
the FMLA right. [The] FMLA provisions are designed to protect employees who exercise leave rights."
Shannon, supra note 13, at 10.
133. See 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993); Shannon, supra note 13, at 11 (construing 29
U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1993)). See also Mann v. Haigh, 891 F. Supp. 256, 264 (E.D.N.C.
1995) (finding that the "whole point of the FMLA, gleaned from even a cursory examination, is to
protect such benefits [as reinstatement, restoration of back pay, continuation of health insurance
benefits and restoration and appropriate enhancements of accrued leave] for eligible employees").
134. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(3) (Supp. V 1993); Shannon, supra note 13, at 11 (construing 29 U.S.C.
§ 2617(a)(3)).
135. See 29 U.S.C. § 2618(b) (Supp. V 1993); H.RL REP. No. 8, supra note 14, at 48.
136. 29 U.S.C. § 2618(b) (Supp. V 1993).
137. H.R. RaP. No. 8, supra note 14, at 49.
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FMLA leave does not satisfy their obligations under the other acts."'
This implies that the drafters intended an employer's FMLA obligations to
be in addition to its obligations under the disability acts. Congress likely
drafted the FMLA provisions for private employers with these ideas in
mind. This information can be helpful in understanding the purpose behind
the FMLA and how it relates to other acts.
The ADA can also be interpreted to provide statutory support for the
employee's argument. The plain meaning of the statute instructs that in an
undue hardship analysis, the employer can only consider certain listed
factors.139 The listed factors pertain only to the specific accommodation
requested, and there is no mention of past accommodations or past
considerations in the analytical framework. 4 For example, one of the
relevant factors is the "nature and cost of the accommodation needed under
this Act [i.e. the ADA].''"4 Because the employer is permitted to consider
only the nature and cost of granting the specific requested ADA accommo-
dation, and the statute does not mention past accommodations, the ADA
suggests that the employer may not consider the nature and cost of previous
leave or previous accommodations.'42
3. The FMLA Medical Information Must Remain Confidential
The distinct requirements for medical certification under the ADA and
the FMLA'43 support an evaluation of the undue hardship test which is
138. Id.
139. 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(10)(3) (Supp. V 1993). For the text of § 1211 1(A)(B), see supra note 4.
140. See 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(10)(B) (Supp. V 1993).
141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. See Jackson & Flaxman, supra note 5, at 36 (warning that the "employer must take care to
administer its [FMLA] policy to avoid punishing employees for exercising their statutory rights").
143. According to the FMLA, requirements for certification provide:
(a) In general - An employer may require that a request for leave ... be supported by a
certification issued by the health care provider of the eligible employee or of the son,
daughter, spouse, or parent of the employee, as appropriate. The employee shall provide, in
a timely manner, a copy of such certification to the employer.
(b) Sufficient certification - Certification... shall be sufficient if it states -
(1) the date on which the serious health condition commenced;
(2) the probable duration of the condition;
(3) the appropriate medical facts within the knowledge of the health care provider regarding
the condition;
(4) [if the leave is to care for an ill relative] a statement that the eligible employee is needed
to care for the [relative] and an estimate of the amount of time that such employee is needed
to care for the [relative]; and [if the employee herself is ill], a statement that the employee
is unable to perform the functions of the position of the employee;
(5)(6)(7) [special certification for intermittent leave]
29 U.S.C. § 2613 (Supp. V 1993).
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independent of previous FMLA leave. Medical information received by the
employer because the employee exercised her FMLA rights should not be
used to later discriminate against the employee in an ADA analysis. For
example, the FMLA permits the employer to obtain detailed medical
certification of the employee's illness,' whereas the ADA only permits
medical inquiries that are "job-related" and "consistent with business
necessity."' 45 Thus, the employer must ensure that if he possesses medical
information about the employee due to FMLA leave, he does not use the
more intrusive information in an ADA reasonable accommodation
analysis.'46
In addition, the FMLA imposes a confidentiality requirement on medical
information obtained under the FMLA. t47 Thus, an employer violates the
FMLA if he uses confidential medical information obtained under the
FMLA in an ADA reasonable accommodation analysis.' 4 In order to
avoid the risk of impropriety, employers are warned that "providing
managers and supervisors with any further information runs the risk that it
will appear that the information is used for purposes inconsistent with the
job-related and business necessity exception." 4 9 These provisions offer
support to the employee's argument that the FMLA and the ADA are
independent acts with distinct purposes and thus, rights exercised under the
FMLA should not be considered in an ADA evaluation. 50
Under the ADA, the employer cannot request medical certification of the employee's disability
unless the inquiry is "job-related and consistent with business necessity." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (Supp.
V 1993); see also Carey & Fink, supra note 16, at 292-93 (explaining the ADA restrictions on medical
certification).
144. See 29 U.S.C. § 2613 (Supp. V 1993).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (Supp. V 1993); see also Walworth & Strange, supra note 21, at 470.
146. See generally Walworth & Strange, supra note 21, at 471-75 (discussing possible conflicts
between ADA informational rights and those of state family and medical leave acts). Walworth and
Strange assert that "[e]mployers should not use [state mandated family or medical leave] certification
to seek information concerning the nature and extent of the disability when such information will not
shed any light on the need for the requested leave .... If the employer seeks more information than
is necessary to confirm that the leave request is valid and reasonable in length, it may violate the
ADA." Id. at 473.
147. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (Supp. V 1993) (stating that medical information is to be maintained "in
separate medical files and treated as a confidential medical record").
148. See id.
149. Walworth & Strange, supra note 21, at 475.
150. The independence argument has another side as well. The employer can argue that if the acts
are truly independent, then the FMLA should not infringe on the employer's right to consider the
overall financial resources of the entity in an ADA undue hardship analysis. Thus, if the ADA is
independent, all factors should be considered, including the economic effect of prior leave. However,
this author does not suggest that the independence of these two acts is absolute. For example, the text
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4. State Law Comparisons
A comparison of state family leave laws and the ADA provides a
compelling analogy for the appropriate interaction between the FMLA and
the ADA.' st Before the FMLA, over thirty states, the District of Colum-
bia, and Puerto Rico, had established mandatory family or medical
leave.' 2 The FMLA does not override any state family or medical leave
laws that provide greater leave rights than the federal law.'53 If an
employer grants family or medical leave in accordance with state law or the
company's own policies, it will be difficult for the employer to later assert
that additional leave is an undue hardship under the ADA.'54 If the
employer is able to find a temporary replacement for the employee while
the employee is on state family medical leave, the employer has demon-
strated its ability to provide such leave. 55 In our hypothetical situation,
the law firm has shown that it was feasible to accommodate its employee
during twelve weeks of FMLA leave. If there have been no major changes
in the firm's economic health, it is difficult for the firm to now argue that
additional leave will be an undue hardship.'56
of the FMLA itself limits FMLA leave to the extent it infringes on any other anti-discrimination laws
(such as the ADA). See 29 U.S.C. § 2651(a) (Supp. V 1993).
151. It is also helpful to examine foreign family medical leave policies. The United States is one
of the few remaining industrialized countries that has not enacted some form of a national family leave
policy. H.R. REP. No. 8, supra note 14, at 31. One hundred thirty-five industrialized and Third World
countries mandate maternity or parental leave, and 127 require compensation during the worker's
absence. Id. Japan, Canada, France, Great Britain, and Italy all have some form of maternity or paid
sick leave for workers. Id. Many countries, including Norway, Austria, the United Kingdom, France,
and Luxembourg also provide leave to care for an elderly parent. Id. at 32. According to the legislative
history, the FMLA "will begin to close the gap between the leave statutes and policies in these countries
and the United States." Id.
152. Although a majority of states provide some sort of family or medical leave, only five states
and the District of Columbia permit medical leave for the employee's own illness or medical condition.
Irvin & Silberman, supra note 109, at 35-47. Connecticut and the District of Columbia provide 16
weeks in 24 months; Maine provides 10 weeks in 24 months; Rhode Island provides 13 weeks in 24
months; Vermont provides 12 weeks in 12 months; and Washington provides 2 weeks in 12 months.
Id.
153. 29 U.S.C. § 2651(b) (Supp. V 1993). See also IRvIN & SILBERMAN, supra note 109, at 35.
154. Walworth & Strange, supra note 21, at 476.
155. Id.
156. But note that this may not hold true in all situations. What may not constitute a hardship in
an economic boom may be a hardship in a subsequent recession. Also, there may be seasonal variations
involving different considerations for some businesses, such as the Christmas season for retailers or tax
season for accountants.
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5. Employers' Fears of the FMLA Have Not Been Realized
Employees can also argue that the consequences of requiring employers
to evaluate undue hardship independently of FMLA leave are not severe.
Statistically, there have not been many FMLA charges brought against
employers, and the FMLA has not been used as a means of bringing
nuisance suits against employers.'57 Although employers worry about
employees abusing FMLA leave, their fears have not been realized.'
Therefore, contrary to employers' fears (especially small businesses),
because few employees actually take advantage of unpaid FMLA leave,'59
it is not very costly to employers. 61 In fact, studies have shown that
FMLA leave is "cost effective" 16' and employee satisfaction is higher
when employers permit family and medical leave. 62 Lastly, without
family leave protection, the societal cost of continuously firing, hiring and
retraining new employees is high.
1 63
157. According to Department of Labor statistics, as of June 30, 1995, only 3,016 FMLA
complaints have been filed with the Department of Labor since the Act's inception in August 1993.
SUMMARY OF AcTIvIry, supra note 116, at 1. In 1,232 of those complaints, no violations were found.
Id. See also Bennett Pine, Briefly Noted, EMPLOYMENT L. INSIDER (Anderson Kill Olick & Oshinsky,
P.C.), Feb. 23, 1994, at 4 (noting rarity of FMLA complaints).
158. The Department of Labor notes that "[v]ery few people can afford to take unnecessary, unpaid
leave." INTERIM FINAL REGULATIONS, supra note 87, at S-4.
159. Uslander, supra note 6, at 3.
160. Id. See also S. REP. No. 3, supra note 5, at 12-14, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 14-16
(noting family and medical leave to be "cost-effective" in terms of reduced hiring and training costs,
turnover, and absenteeism). Despite the fact that many employees are reluctant to take long periods of
unpaid leave due to their own financial situation, the importance of the FMLA is not diluted. The
FMLA provides essential job and benefits security. It assures all protected employees that, in the case
of an unforeseen emergency, their jobs will be safe.
161. S. REP. No. 3, supra note 5, at 14, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 16. A multistate study
has shown that employer implementation of state mandated family and medical leave is "neither costly
nor burdensome." Id. at 14, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 16. (testimony of Dr. Ellen Galinsky,
copresident of Families and Work Institute).
162. Uslander, supra note 6, at 3-5. See also testimony by Ms. Jeanne Kardos, the director of a
corporation that has already implemented family and medical leave policies. S. REP. No. 3, supra note
5, at 13-14, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 15-16. Ms. Kardos has found such policies to be "cost-
effective rather than costly... [because] it serves productivity. We get people back who are not only
highly trained and skilled in what they do, but we get them in such a way that they are very grateful
to the company that cares for them, and they stay with us." Id. Although family leave will not have an
identical effect when leave is federally mandated, it will be much the same, and employers will benft
because their employees will view them as accommodating and reasonable.
163. See S. REP. No. 3, supra note 5, at 12, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 14.
"[D~iscrimination against qualified employees costs society millions of dollars in lost wages, lost
productivity and needless disability payments." Id. (testimony by Ms. Barbara Hoffian, Vice President
of the National Coalition for Cancer Survivorship).
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One may question the importance of FMLA leave when so few people
are affected by it and many companies or states have their own forms of
family leave. First, it is important to note that the FMLA is a relatively
new law. It is thus understandable that there are not many reported cases.
Second, one must also remember that although many employees cannot
afford to needlessly take twelve weeks of unpaid leave, the FMLA is
essential to employees who require shorter periods of leave and need job
and benefits security. It is also crucial to the employee who finds herself
or a family member in a long-term catastrophic medical emergency. At the
very least, employees affected by such catastrophes have the assurance that
their jobs and medical benefits are secure.
IV. PROPOSAL
The employers' most prevalent fear is that employees will utilize FMLA
leave to abuse their ADA right to a reasonable accommodation and that the
costs will be excessive. However, these concerns are checked by the courts'
application of the undue hardship standard. As indicated by the cases
interpreting the ADA and the analogous Rehabilitation Act, the courts do
not permit employees to take advantage of an employer.1" Because the
courts only consider past leave as probative of undue hardship when it rises
to the level of abuse, it is unnecessary for an employer to consider previous
FMLA leave in an ADA undue hardship analysis. 6 This Note proposes
codification of the judicial interpretation of the undue hardship analy-
SS166sis. t6
164. See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
165. It may seem that because the courts already curb employee abuse of past leave in analyzing
the employer's undue hardship defense, the courts and the employer will consider past FMLA leave in
proving employee abuse. This may seem to resolve the original issue in favor of the employer.
However, although the courts may look at the employee's past leave history, the courts will only
consider past leave significant and probative in the undue hardship analysis when there has been a clear
record of abuse by the employee. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Catto, 778 F. Supp. 570 (D.D.C. 1991). In
other words, past FMLA leave may be introduced as evidence of abuse at any point, but the courts will
not acknowledge this evidence as probative of undue hardship unless it rises to a certain level of abuse.
See id.
This proposal codifies this viewpoint, permiting employers to consider past FMLA leave only after
an employee has abused the right to FMLA and ADA leave a specified number of times. The fact that
the courts check employee abuse does not indicate that the employer can always consider past leave
in an undue hardship analysis; these judicial checks merely set a threshold standard for employee abuse
before the courts and employers can consider past leave.
166. See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
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A. The Proposed ADA Amendments
In order to give employers and employees clearer guidelines, this author
suggests an amendment to the ADA to specifically clarify the status of
previous FMLA leave. In the list of factors to consider in an undue
hardship analysis, the employer should consider "the overall resources of
the business,"167 disregarding the cost of previous FMLA leave granted
during the previous twelve-month period. This will ensure that the two acts
are evaluated independently and will protect employees who wish to
exercise both their FMLA and ADA rights without retaliation.
In order to prevent the employee from abusing this modification and
taking both FMLA and ADA leave each and every year as is theoretically
possible, another amendment to the ADA should limit the number of times
an employee can take both FMLA and ADA leave without penalty. The
limit should be two consecutive twelve-month periods.'68 This would
provide employers with a statutory right to limit the amount of times an
employee can take both FMLA and ADA leave without penalty. This
would also provide both employers and employees with certainty about
their rights and limitations under the two acts.
In our hypothetical, if this was the first time that our employee requested
an ADA accommodation following twelve weeks of FMLA leave, the
employer could not consider the twelve weeks of FMLA leave as a factor
in the undue hardship analysis. However, the result would be different if
this was the third consecutive year that our employee took twelve weeks
of FMLA leave followed by a request for an ADA reasonable accommoda-
tion. Under these facts, the employer could consider past FMLA leave in
examining the cost of the accommodation.
B. The Financial Resources Test
An alternative amendment would always allow the employer to consider
past leave granted as an element of its overall financial resources; however,
the employer would not be allowed to consider the amount of money spent
on FMLA leave for the individual employee if it had no effect on the
organization's overall financial status. This view takes the employer's fiscal
realities into consideration. A smaller organization may be severely harmed
by granting an employee twelve weeks of FMLA leave, so it is unrealistic
167. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B)(i) (Supp. V 1993).
168. The two consecutive twelve-month periods should not follow the employee if she switches jobs
because we are only concerned with an employee abusing her leave rights to the detriment of the same
employer. A leave of absence should stay the time calculation.
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to prevent the employer from considering this in an undue hardship
analysis.'69 However, this view also protects employees from discrimina-
tion by prohibiting an employer from denying an accommodation that does
not affect its overall financial resources. 7 ' In this way, an employer
could not penalize an individual employee solely in retaliation for the
exercise of FMLA rights.
V. CONCLUSION
This Note has demonstrated that an employee's FMLA rights may be
compromised if an employer considers past FMLA leave in an ADA undue
hardship evaluation. The employer has a valid economic argument that past
leave always affects an employer's resources and must be considered in an
undue hardship evaluation. However, the FMLA was designed to ensure
that employees are not penalized for taking the federally mandated
leave. 7' Additionally, it would be unjust and contrary to the intent of the
drafters to discriminate against employees for exercising their FMLA rights.
Therefore, it is in the best interest of both employers and employees to
clarify the interaction of these two statutes. In order to provide such
clarification, Congress should amend the ADA to specifically protect
employees' FMLA rights. Congress should also limit the exercise of these
rights in order to prevent employee abuse. The employers' conflicting
obligations to the FMLA and the ADA have puzzled employers and
lawyers alike. However, the suggested measures will eliminate the
confusion that has surrounded the interaction of the FMLA and the ADA
in the workplace.
Lisa J. Gitnik
169. To some extent, it seems unfair to give employees different rights depending solely on the size
of their employer. However, the coverage of all employment discrimination acts is dependent on the
number of individuals employed by a business. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1988) (employer must
employ more than 15 employees to be governed by Title VII); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(5) (Supp. V 1993)
(employer must employ more than 15 employees to be governed by the ADA); 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)
(1988) (employer must employ more than 20 employees to be governed by the ADEA). Note that the
employers who could be most severely harmed, the smallest employers, are specifically exempt.
170. For example, suppose employer E spent $10,000 in granting FMLA leave to employee A in
1992. When A returns and requests additional leave as a reasonable accommodation under the ADA,
E cannot consider the fact that he has already spent $10,000 on A and does not want to spend more.
E can only consider the prior $10,000 cost if it affects the overall financial resources of the company.
If granting additional leave would severely harm the company's fiscal status, then the leave can be
denied as an undue hardship.
171. See Shannon, supra note 13, at 10.
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